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Abstract 
This paper analyses wage flexibility in Chinese labor market using micro panel data of the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) for the period 1989-2009. We find the reaction of wages to local 
unemployment significantly varies across different worker groups. China’s highly coordinated wage-setting 
institutions might contribute to the flexible wages of workers with strong bargaining power. However, 
workers with weak bargaining power have rigid wages and could be easily laid off. The highly coordinated 
big firms and public sector show more significant wage flexibility than the lagging small/medium firms and 
private sector with coordination failures. Migration workers also have less flexible wages than local 
workers. Moreover, the major wage flexibility is associated with the 1990s reform when the labor market 
moves from a centrally-planned system to a market-oriented system. After the public sector retrenchment, 
the labor market seems recover the rigidity in the 2000s. Heckman adjusted results really show significant 
selectivity effects, but would not change our basic conclusions.    
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Wage Flexibility in Chinese Labor Market 1989-2009 
 
1. Introduction 
 
The past three decades have seen an unprecedented economic growth in China. Since 
the 1990s, China has dramatically switched from a centrally-planned to a market-oriented 
economic system and embarked on public sector and rural-urban migration reforms. To 
assess directly the extent to which China has moved towards a competitive and flexible 
labor market, we need information on how workers’ wages respond to labor market 
conditions (Appleton et al., 2005; Moore and Pentecost, 2006). The flexibility of the real 
wage rate is considered to be an important element of labor market flexibility to adapt 
structural changes of this magnitude in China. Hence, exploring the wage flexibility in 
Chinese labor market has become an important issue for understanding the Chinese 
transition experiences.  
This paper endeavors to estimate and analyze the wage flexibility in the Chinese labor 
market over the period of 1989-2009. Although how the price of labor is affected by the 
market condition may be the oldest empirical question in economics, wage flexibility is 
still a big challenge and an ambiguous area for academia and policy makers in China 
(Freeman, 2007). We apply the real wage adjustment over the business cycle as proxy of 
wage flexibility and investigate the functioning of local labor markets in China. Real 
wages being flexible to business cycle means adverse shocks result in wage adjustments 
rather than more unemployment. Thus, the efficient functioning of a labor market with 
flexible wages can help the economy recover from adverse shocks faster than a labor 
market with rigid wages (Moore and Pentecost, 2006).  
China has a highly regulated and coordinated labor market which are in a volatile 
marketization process and forms an instructive contrast with the more developed 
economies such as the US (Devereux, 2001; Shin and Solon, 2007), the UK (Devereux 
and Hart, 2006) and Germany (Peng and Siebert, 2012). In practice, China’s wage-setting 
institutions are regarded as a dual system of the public and private sectors, as well as 
urban-rural division (Peng, 1992; Song, 1990). On the one hand, employment and wage 
issues in China can only be correctly understood in the context of the reform 
accompanied by the transition from a planned economy to a market economy(Cai and 
Wang, 2010; Nee, 1996). Under the planned economic regime before the reform, wages 
of all urban workers were centrally determined by the Bureau of Labor and Personnel 
through a national wage grid system. Up until the end of 1980s, the state and collective 
sector still hired more than 95% of the urban workers (Meng, 2000; Meng et al., 2013).  
Neither job mobility nor wage determination had changed much from the planned 
economic regime during the 1980s. As a result of the government control, nearly all 
workers were covered by the rigid wages in the state or collective sector (Kang and Peng, 
2012b). To vitalize the “socialist market economy” authorized in the early 1990s, the 
government initiated the ice-breaking of wage rigidity and finally made it legal for the 
SOEs to adjust their wage policies and to fire unwanted workers. The other side of the 
same coin is that the SOEs also had the right to retain a proportion of their profits to pay 
bonuses to workers (Cai and Wang, 2010). Hence, the rigid wage system in China has 
been gradually replaced by a flexible wage system, as the labor market began to 
determine wages and employment (Freeman, 2007; Meng and Kidd, 1997). This paper 
aims to shed new light on the wage flexibility problem in Chinese labor market under the 
background of these transitional changes. 
On the other hand, wage setting institutions are highly command and market 
coordinated in China (Lin, 1995), which may result in wages being more responsive to 
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macroeconomic shocks. The dramatic marketization transformation provided greater 
autonomy to SOEs and resulted in a radical program of retrenchment within SOEs. In 
1997, the premier Zhu Rongji’s government implemented the “zhuadafangxiao” (retain 
the large, release the small) policy. In 1997–1998 around 12 million urban state sector 
workers were laid off, as more and more workers shifted to private sector employment. 
By 2009, employment in the state or collective sector had dropped to 54% (Meng, et al., 
2013). The survived large SOEs are much less in number and more easily to be 
coordinated by the command of (central) government, so are more responsive to 
macroeconomic shocks. It is a good strategy for those lagging private small and medium 
enterprises to follow the wage adjustment of their “big brothers”-large SOEs in the labour 
market, that is, market coordination. In other words, the parties’ gains to changing wages 
are higher if all change, so that there is a “strategic complementarity” of wage flexibility, 
indicating that wage rigidity may be a result of coordination failure in wage adjustments 
(Ball and Romer, 1991; Peng and Siebert, 2008).  
However, in the early years of the 2000s, the new-elected Premier Wen Jiabao’s 
government changed the tone of marketization policy and strengthened the monopoly 
status of large SOEs in the pillar industries of the national economy such as steel, 
petroleum, aviation, coal and finance (“guojingmintui”, The State Advances as the 
Private Sector Retreats). Large SOEs have controlled so much resource that they are 
trapped in the inertia of easy money and insensitive to market changes. The private small 
and medium enterprises used to move in the tandem with large SOEs would fail in the 
market coordination. The two different policy periods may cause a structure break of 
wage flexibility. Meng et al. (2013) also argue that the major changes of wage structure 
occurred in the 1990s when the labor market moved from a centrally-planned system to a 
market-oriented system. Therefore, we provide a factual basis for inquiry on how 
command and market coordination makes real wages responsive to macroeconomic 
shocks over last two decades in China.  
In addition, this paper stresses the heterogeneity of the wage flexibility for different 
employee groups by examining the impact of labor restructuring on the wage responses 
to the business cycle. Besides above labor restructuring by public-private ownership and 
firm sizes, the rural–urban migration has soared in the urban China with the loosening of 
administrative controls over population movements. For decades since the late 1950s, the 
overall distribution of the Chinese population had been shaped by the strict policy of the 
household registration (hukou) system, so rural-urban migration was almost non-existent 
up until the end of 1980s. By 2009, around 140 million rural labor force (accounting for 
one-third of the urban labor force) had moved to cities to work (Meng, et al., 2013). 
Liberalization of restrictions on rural–urban migration raises the possibility of local 
workers with urban hukou having to compete for work with migration workers from rural 
region. It will naturally arouse the questions about and how migrants’ wages respond to 
the labor market condition, and whether they are discriminated for less job chances 
through a rigid wage setting mechanism. The impact of rural–urban migration on wage 
flexibility is also the contribution of this paper. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present our 
estimation methods, and in Section 3, we describe the data. Section 4 presents empirical 
results by workers’ and firms’ characteristics. We also test the robustness of results by 
considering selection biases. The final section concludes.  
 
2. Estimation methods 
In the empirical literature the wage flexibility has often been specified (and estimated) 
as a reduced form assuming the labor market shocks (for simplicity, the changes of local 
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unemployment) as exogenous variables. However, if the wage flexibility is interpreted as 
a structural relation, it is necessary to introduce some assumptions concerning how the 
long-run market equilibrium is determined. Hence, a structural relation in terms of a 
wage equation and a labor demand equation is necessary. Following Ammermuller et al. 
(2010), the model can be written as follows: 
 
    [ (  )       ]                                      (1a) 
 
    [            ]                                        (1b) 
 
where l indexes the province (R),  Rl is the provincial fixed effect; W is the wage level; U 
is the provincial unemployment; Z is a demand shock; and X and Y are two vectors of 
control variables, that is, respectively, for the wage equation (1a) and the labor demand 
equation (1b). The identification of equation (1a) can be obtained either by assuming that 
only variations in Z occur (that is, idiosyncratic shocks affect only the demand), or by 
using instrumental variables (IV) techniques to instrument regional unemployment. 
Nijkamp and Poot (2005) summarize that less than 10% of the studies use instrumental 
variables (IV) to control for endogeneity of the unemployment rate and employ Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) directly as the estimation technique instead. In this paper, we follow 
the tradition of Bils (1985) and Solon et al. (1994) to use the unemployment change of 
current year as the proxy of business cycle.  
Therefore, the standard decomposition of total wage growth (Devereux and Hart, 2006; 
Solon et al., 1997) for three provinces (l =1, 2 and 3) is: 
 
 (    )  (         ) (     )     (     )     (     )           ( ) 
 
where P2 and P3 denotes the proportion of workers are in province 2 and 3, and E(ΔlnW1), 
E(ΔlnW2), and E(ΔlnW3) is the expected wage growth of workers in province1, 2 and 3. 
Differentiating equation (2) with respect to the change in the unemployment rate, Δu, 
provides a decomposition of total wage responses: 
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The first three terms are the weighted average wage response of workers in three 
provinces. The last two terms represent the cyclicality of the working probability in the 
provinces weighted by the wage growth of workers in province 2 and 3 relative to 
workers in province 1 (i.e. regional wage differentials). Since the last two working 
probability terms are very small, we focus on the weighted average wage responses. This 
decomposition process can be extended to more than three provinces. 
The traditional approach to examine labor market flexibility is to estimate a Phillips 
curve as in Pentecost and Sessions (2002), or a wage curve (Blanchflower and Oswald, 
1990; Card, 1995). Studies using aggregated data have concluded that real wages are at 
best weakly flexible in China (Sabin, 1999; Wu, 2004). However, estimations of wage 
flexibility using aggregated wage are counter-cyclically biased because changing 
composition partially offsets measured wage flexibility (Bils, 1985; Solon, et al., 1994). 
Low-wage persons drop out of the workforce in recessions, and they return to it in booms, 
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which may bring downwards biases of the estimation of wage flexibility (Heckman, 2001; 
Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985). For example, more unskilled workers become employed 
in expansion and pull the aggregate average wage downwards. The converse occurs in 
recession. Hence, traditional aggregated statistics may exhibit “too little variability” over 
the business cycle. In order to remove the compositional biases from the wage measure, 
Solon et al. (1994) uses wage differencing approach for micro panel data. Following the 
same vein, we specify differencing wage equations and empirically estimate the links 
between individual wages and provincial unemployment rates. Thus, our estimations use 
a micro panel data and remove the composition biases of aggregated measures of wage 
adjustment over the business cycle.  
Moreover, we match the micro panel data of real wage movements in the China Health 
and Nutrition Survey (CHNS) to local unemployment rates. Blanchflower and Oswald 
(2005) argue that with segmented local labor markets, economic shocks to one province 
mainly have an impact on the level of local wages, leading to a negative relationship 
between wages and unemployment “within” provinces. Empirical estimates are usually 
based on highly disaggregated data in order to control for heterogeneity in provincial 
labor markets both in terms of workers’ (that is, gender, age, education, marital status etc.) 
and firms’ characteristics (that is, firm size, ownership, location etc.). However, the 
unemployment rate usually refers to the region where individuals work (or firms are 
located). The use of variables at different levels of disaggregation may lead to biased 
estimates if all the individuals who work in the same province share some common 
factors. Moulton (1986) shows that individuals in the same year/province will share some 
common component of variance that is not entirely attributable either to their measured 
characteristics (e.g., age) or to the local unemployment rate in that year. Therefore, the 
standard error of the coefficient of the unemployment variable would be underestimated 
in an OLS regression (Shin, 1994). From a statistical point of view, this can overestimate 
the importance of provincial unemployment in influencing individual wages (Moulton, 
1986; Moulton, 1990).  
To tackle this Moulton problem, a two-step procedure has been used by Solon et al. 
(1994) and Blanchard and Katz (1997). In the first step, individual wages are regressed 
on personal characteristics and on province*year fixed effects, which are used as proxies 
for the wages at province level. Once these are estimated, they are regressed against 
provincial unemployment over time, as well as province and year fixed effects. The latter 
variables are needed in order to seize all permanent components of the relationship 
between wages and unemployment and leave only the transitory components to the 
unemployment coefficients (García-Mainar and Montuenga-Gómez, 2003). In step 1, we 
estimate a wage difference equation using individual data. This equation is given by: 
 
  
    
       
             ∑ ∑        
    
      
 
   
                                        ( ) 
 
where wilt  is real hourly wages of individual i in province l (l= Guangxi, ..., Shandong, 9 
provinces in the CHNS) and year t (t = 1991, ..., 2009, 7 wage differencing waves in the 
CHNS), and s equals 2, 3 or 4 according to whether the most recent interview before the 
year t interview was two, three or four years earlier. Ageilt is a cubic in age, Rl denotes 
province dummy variables, Yt denotes year dummy variables and ilt is a random error 
term. This step gives us a panel data of wage changes for the workers in province l and 
between t and t-s, that is, αlt.  
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In step 2, we derive estimates of the wage flexibility of workers by regressing αlt on 
the unemployment change variable at provincial level (ΔUlt), with provincial fixed effects 
(Rl) and time dummies (Yt). This equation is given by: 
 
   ̂                                                                     ( ) 
 
In this step, we only have time series variation for each province, reducing the number of 
observations – in our case 7 wage differencing waves of 9 provinces (actually only 58 
observations in the step 2 as the wage data of Liaoning are missing in 1997, Heilongjiang 
missing in 1989, 1991 and 1993). We use weighted least squares where the weights are 
the numbers of individuals observed in each province and year as we described in 
equation (3). Our data cover more than one full business cycle in China and can reflect 
the wage flexibility situations over the last two decades of labor market reform. 
                     
3. Data Description 
 
The main data used in this paper are the eight waves (1989, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 
2004, 2006 and 2009) of the China Health and Nutrition Survey (CHNS), which employ 
a multistage random-cluster sampling process to draw households from 9 provinces 
(Guangxi, Guizhou, Heilongjiang, Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangsu, Liaoning, and 
Shandong). We have two samples of micro data at individual level:  
1) Work force sample, including all people aged 16-65 residing in the urban region
1
. 
Descriptive statistics of an unbalanced panel of 7,748 individuals (3,692 males and 4,056 
females) are presented in the top panel of Table 1. Total observation number is 23,795 
including 11,603 males and 12,192 females. The average length of time series of panel 
unit is about 3 waves. Females in the urban workforce are a little older (40.1 years) than 
males (39.8 years), while males have higher educational attainment than females. 20.8% 
males and 15.6% females have never been married in the workforce sample. About 66-67% 
residents in the urban region have the urban hukou, so one third urban residents are 
migrants from the rural region which is consistent with the findings in Meng et al. (2013). 
The average family size is 4 persons in urban region which may be a typical Chinese 
household including two parents and two children;  
2) Wagers sample, including all wage earning employees in the urban region. We 
exclude self-employed workers and owners of private or individual enterprises because it 
is difficult to separate their wages from profit income. Descriptive statistics of an 
unbalanced panel of 6,126 individuals (3,020 males and 3,106 females) are presented in 
the bottom panel of Table 1. Total observation number is 16,549 including 8,618 males 
and 7,931 females. The average length of time series of panel unit is about 2.7 waves. 
Male employees have more chances to work in public sector and big firms (100 
employees+) than females
2
. Both male and female wage earners have lower proportions 
of urban hukou than the work force, suggesting higher labor market participation of rural-
urban migrants than local people.   
                                                 
1
 In this paper, we focus on the non-agricultural residents in the urban region because the official 
unemployment rates in the rural region are not available. Residential region is different from the household 
registration (hukou). Since the early 1950s, China implemented a household registration (hukou) system 
connected with the social welfare system, whereby individuals born in a city are given an urban hukou, and 
those who were born in countryside are given a rural hukou. Individuals with rural hukou cannot benefit 
from the urban welfare system, even though they might work and reside in cities (Meng, et al., 2013).  
2
 The public sector includes all civil servants and employees in the SOEs, as the private sector includes all 
employees in the private and collective enterprises. Since 1990, China appears to be evolving towards a 
standard mixed economy with a sizeable public sector and a vibrant private sector (Appleton, et al., 2005). 
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(Table 1 around here) 
 
The wage variable used here is the real hourly wage in 1995 prices, which is real 
annual earnings divided by annual total working hours. Nominal annual earnings, 
including regular wages, subsidies and bonuses from the employer
3
, are converted into 
real annual earnings using corresponding deflators of provincial urban Consumer Price 
Index (CPI), provided by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC). Male 
employees earn about 19% (=0.944-0.753) more than females over the entire period. 
Actually, the wages grow so fast that the wage levels of both males and females in the 
2000s are about 120% higher than 10 years ago, which brings larger gender gap in the 
2000s than in the 1990s. The gender gap, however, is narrower in the small/medium 
firms than in the big firms, as well as narrower in the public sector than in the private 
sector. We find that the wage premium of working in big firms is larger for males 
(43.5%=1.218-0.783) than for females (36.9%=0.989-0.62). Situation flips in the firms 
with different ownership, as the wage premium of working in the public sector is larger 
for females (11.8%=0.803-0.685) than for males (only 4.7%=0.962-0.915). Urban hukou 
also brings about 15% wage premiums for both males and females. Therefore, a job in a 
large firm is more important for males in urban China, while a job in the public sector is 
more important for females. Urban hukou is equally important for both males and females. 
The dramatic changing wage structure suggests a segmented labor market and strong 
selection of jobs.   
When it comes to the annual growth rates of wages (defined as wage changes between 
two consecutive waves divided by corresponding number of years), most groups shows 
very similar growth rate of wages (about 10% per year) over the last two decades, during 
which the 2000s years saw a little slower speed of wage growth than that in the 1990s. 
Wages of males in the public sector (11% per year) grow much faster than males working 
in private sector (only 8% per year) and males without urban hukou (the least growth rate 
7.4% per year). However, we do not find the similar disadvantages of working in the 
private sector or migration status for females. The privatization and urbanization reform 
seems to favor females rather than males. Thus, in both sense of level and growth rate 
there is great wage disparity among employee groups by gender, firm ownership, firm 
size and urban/rural regions. The wage structure and its evolution over the period 1989-
2009 need further exploration on the wage responses to labor market conditions. 
For the macro data of business cycle, we splice the Chinese National Labor Statistics 
Yearbook 1994-2009 and Chinese National Statistics Yearbook 1993-2009 to develop an 
unemployment dataset corresponding to the CHNS at provincial level. This urban 
registered unemployment rates may be the only official information sources of 
unemployment data at the provincial level over the period 1989-2009. Hence, they are 
used as our cyclical indicator of local labor market. The geographic location of the 
provinces covered by the CHNS can be broadly categorized into four regions for 
simplicity: Northeast (Heilongjiang and Liaoning), Coastal (Jiangsu and Shandong), 
Interior (Henan, Hubei and Hunan) and West (Guangxi and Guizhou). Figure 1 presents 
the regional unemployment rates since 1985. We can find the unemployment rates were 
as low as around 2% at the middle of the 1980s for all four regions. After that, the 
unemployment rates have been increasing over the entire period and doubled to around 4% 
in 2009, reflecting the transition process of a labor market after the 1970s.  
                                                 
3
 Kang and Peng (2012a) find the wage cyclicality in urban China is mainly from the bonus and subsidy 
components of gross wages. We focus on the average hourly rate including all basic salary, bonus and 
subsidy components in this paper. 
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Moreover, there are very different variation patterns across regions. The less 
developed Western provinces (Guangxi and Guizhou) have much higher and more 
volatile unemployment rates than other regions before the 2000s, which arrive at the 
summit of 5.4% in 1997. However, the unemployment of the Northeast (Heilongjiang 
and Liaoning) dramatically increased after 1992 and peaked 5.7% in 2002. It is consistent 
with the reform of the SOEs and the shift in industrial structure out of heavy industry 
over the period of 1992-2002 (Appleton, et al., 2005), which affected the old 
industrialized provinces in the Northeast more than others. As expected, the most 
developed Coastal provinces (Jiangsu and Shandong) have the lowest unemployment 
rates after 2002.  
 
(Figure 1 around here) 
 
Cai and Wang (2010) argue that the Chinese reform, without a clear blueprint from the 
beginning, was initiated and carried out to solve urgent problems in the economic system 
and to seek instant welfare gain. Hence, the reform progress is characterized by the 
gradual approach of “crossing the river by feeling the stones” (Appleton, et al., 2005). 
Meanwhile, while the reform, by and large, advances in a gradual and incremental 
manner, it also takes relatively radical measures in certain regions and at certain stages 
from time to time. The choices of forms and measures in the reform process depend on 
adaptability of different components of the economic system and on how much the 
society is capable of adapting itself to the reform.  
In order to test the gradual and spontaneous characteristics of labor market reform, 
Table 2 displays the pairwise correlation coefficients of annual unemployment changes at 
provincial level. Except a few cases, for example, within the Coastal (Jiangsu and 
Shandong, 0.4451**) and the West (Guangxi and Guizhou, 0.5075**), there is no 
significant correlation between provincial unemployment changes. The local labor 
markets seem quite segmented and isolated each other. The provincial governments could 
have taken different experiments for economic development according to their 
comparative advantages and disadvantages over last two decades. Hence, local labor 
markets may experience different reform paths as the changes of provincial 
unemployment are not coordinated or controlled by central government. These disparate 
patterns of unemployment alleviate our concern on that the unemployment volatility in 
China could have been “damped” by active labor market policies of central or provincial 
governments (Nickell, 1997). Therefore, the changes of unemployment are likely to 
reflect true volatility of Chinese local labor markets. 
 
(Table 2 around here) 
 
4. Empirical results 
4.1 Basic results 
 
The OLS two step results for the unemployment change coefficients from equation (5) 
are reported in Table 3. The estimated wage response to unemployment is significantly 
negative for urban males. One point increase of the local unemployment rate could 
decrease the real wages of males by 6.197%. Wage response to unemployment is also 
negative for females, but not significant. A flexible wage setting mechanism can drop 
wages as the labor market become worse, vice versa, which show a negative association 
between wage and unemployment and is regarded as a good institutional arrangement for 
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economic growth and stability. Our results are consistent with a flexible labor market in 
the transition process. 
Moreover, we differentiate estimation by employees’ marital status (married and 
single) and education levels (upper middle school and above, and below higher school), 
and find markedly difference among sub-labor markets. Married and higher educated 
male workers still show significant wage flexibility. One point increase of the local 
unemployment rate could decrease the real wages of married (high educated) males by 
7.295% (6.007%). Marriage and higher education mean better bargaining strategy and 
market information, so that easier to be coordinated to flexible wages by government and 
keep their jobs over the bad time.  
A little surprising result is that urban female workers with lower education level 
(under Upper middle school) rather than higher education have flexible wages. One point 
increase of the local unemployment rate could decrease the real wages of unskilled 
females by 6.416%, but insignificant for high skilled females. O’Mahony and Peng (2008) 
find similar results in European countries that unskilled females in services are 
complementary to information and communication technology (ICT) hence have 
advantages in wage bargaining as a whole. If we consider those female-dominant 
industries such as hospitality, nurses, primary education, community caring and other 
services, unskilled females may have better bargaining strategy on jobs and wages as an 
industry or professional organization in China. Thus, it is highly possible for unskilled 
females to have flexible wages and keep their jobs over the business cycle. On the 
contrary, skilled females may be vulnerable as the time is bad because they could not 
change their wages.  
 
(Table 3 around here) 
 
For other groups of workers, we cannot find wage flexibility maybe because of their 
weak bargaining power and coordination failures. Time period division shows the wage 
flexibility is mainly from the dramatic reforms of labor market in the 1990s for both 
males and females. However, the labor market recovers the rigidity in the 2000s, which is 
consistent with the renationalization process of the Premier Wen Jiabao’s government.   
 
4.2 Labor Restructuring 
4.2.1 Firm size 
 
We estimate the wage flexibility by firm size and time period in Table 4a. Males in big 
firms have flexible wage. One point increase of the local unemployment rate could 
decrease the real wages of males in big firms by 5.95%. Males in small/medium firms 
also have right sign and are close to be significant. Females have no flexible wages in 
either big or small/medium firms. When we come to the two-period division, wage 
responses of both males and females to local unemployment are negative and significant 
during the 1990s, except the females in small/medium firms (-7.344%) being very close 
to be significant. For the 2000s, no one is significant. It is consistent with a coordinated 
labor market in the transition process.  
First of all, most big firms are public-owned before the 1990s and only have rigid 
wages. While various reform measures had been introduced to increase labor flexibility, 
the dismissal of state employees remained an exception up until the early 1990s. The 
retrenchment of during the 1990s enforces the big firms wage to be flexible to keep their 
jobs. The highly coordinated big firms may show sensitive wages to the labor market 
conditions as we find in Table 4a. Second, in the mid-1990s, a radical ownership reform 
10 
 
program was launched, under which state ownership was to be maintained only among 
large SOEs; small- and medium-sized SOEs were to be restructured through privatization, 
mergers, and bankruptcies (Xu et al., 2005). In late 1997, the “zhuadafangxiao” policy 
strengthens the command coordination of the big firms according to the macroeconomic 
conditions, but let the small/medium firms operate in a market coordination process. The 
large-scale labor retrenchment program attempts to reverse the money-losing trends of 
the SOE sector. Our results show this policy has been once very successful to get the 
wage flexibility for all workers. The wages in the 1990s are very sensitive to labor market 
conditions. However, during the 2000s, the “guojingmintui” policy allows more space for 
big firms to maintain and strengthen their monopoly position and keep their rigid wages. 
Thereafter, the command coordination of big firms and market coordination of 
small/medium firms just dysfunction. 
 
4.2.2 Ownership restructuring  
 
Given China’s unique experience in labor restructuring, an analysis of China’s wage 
flexibility in the public sector downsizing process should generate valuable insights for 
the ongoing policy debates over how to best restructure public enterprises. We 
differentiate estimation by firm ownership and time periods in Table 4b. The wage 
flexibility in Chinese labor market is mainly from the public sector. For males in the 
public sector, one point increase of the local unemployment rate could decrease the real 
wages by 7.466% (and very significant), but only 5.537% (and less significant) in the 
private sector. Females in the public sector also show significantly flexible wages (-
7.031%) but not in the private sector, which is very strong evidence of coordination. 
Similarly, we find wage flexibility for both males and females in the 1990s, except the 
females in the private sector which have the right sign but insignificant.  
The reform program termed “activating the system of permanent employment” 
initiated in 1987 touched upon the core system of the “iron rice bowl” and began revising 
the legacy of traditional labor policies under the planning system (Cai and Wang, 2010). 
The retrenchment of public sector employment is one of the most important reform 
programs, especially when the rigid wage setting under central planning had created 
severe labor redundancy and skill mismatch. The removal of wage rigidity in the 
developing labor market is imperative for Chinese economic restructuring. Hence, the 
reform aiming at ‘‘breaking up the iron-rice-bowl” has been quite successful in the public 
sector during the 1990s and made good progress in developing a flexible wage setting 
mechanism. However, the renationalization in the 2000s recovers the rigidity of wage 
setting mechanism in the labor markets. Both males and females in the public or private 
sector lose their wage flexibility in recent years, which may bring more systematic risk 
for employment and decrease the efficiency of the labor market. 
 
(Table 4 around here) 
 
4.2.3 Rural-Urban migration 
 
Rural-urban migrants are regarded as second-class workers in urban China (Démurger  
et al., 2009). The main institutional barrier to mobility was the household registration 
(hukou) system excluding the workers without urban hukou from the urban welfare 
system, which provided residents with urban hukou with food ration, housing, medical 
care, education, childcare, and pension, and also has access to desirable positions in the 
labor market (Wang and Moffatt, 2008). This system made it practically very difficult, if 
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not impossible for rural hukou holders to survive in cities. The reform of SOEs makes 
competition between urban unemployed and rural migrants harder, which was further 
reinforced by administrative regulations against rural migrants. Several city governments 
had implemented local regulations to restrict rural migrants’ employment and even forced 
enterprises to lay off migrant workers in favor of urban local workers. Hence, hukou 
policy which causes employment and wage distortions is regarded as an inefficient 
institutional factor in Chinese labor market (Chan and Zhang, 1999).  
In Table 4c, we find evidence of disadvantages of rural hukou in flexible wage setting. 
One point increase of the local unemployment rate could decrease the real hourly wage of 
local males (with urban hukou) by 6.804%. For those male migrants (working in the 
urban region but without urban hukou), however, their wages are totally rigid. Workers 
with urban hukou obviously have more power to bargain their wages and jobs, and more 
easily to be coordinated for flexible wages. Hence, these incumbent male workers are 
more likely to retain their jobs in face of adverse shock of business cycle. For local 
females, the wage responses to local labor market have right signs, but insignificant. As 
the dramatic reform of the 1990s is concerned, both local males (-9.522) and females (-
9.577) with urban hukou can have very flexible wage during this period, while only 
female migrants have flexible wages. During the 2000s, everyone’s wage becomes rigid 
and easily to be fired.   
Therefore, hukou status does matter in workers’ wage flexibility, and then whether 
they can retain their jobs in the time of bad. That is, urban hukou leads to better 
bargaining position for their contract on job and wages. They may have pro-cyclical and 
flexible wages to help their employers, so they can survive the recession of business 
cycle and benefit in the prosperity. Male migrants have rigid wages over the two periods, 
obviously the most vulnerable group to be fired in time of bad.  
  
4.3 Selectivity 
 
We consider the possible selection biases in above wage differencing approach of real 
wage flexibility using micro panel data. Hence, we examine the relation between workers’ 
characteristics (age, education and marital status etc.), province*year dummies and the 
probability of employment in two consecutive waves by testing vector of coefficients γ in 
the probit estimates of the selection equation: 
 
  (                                     )   (    )                       (6) 
 
 
Probability of employed in two consecutive waves is given by cubic age, 5 education 
dummies, marital status, urban/rural hukou, family size and all province*year dummies 
(Xit). Residual errors of two equations (4) and (6) follow normal distribution with mean 0 
and standard deviations of σ and 1, and are correlated each other: u1 ~ N(0; σ); u2 ~ N(0; 
1); corr(u1; u2) = ρ. When ρ ≠ 0, standard regression techniques applied to equation (4) 
yield biased results.  
From these estimates, the non-selection hazard—what Heckman (1979) referred to as 
the inverse of the Mills’ ratio, mit —for each observation is computed as    
 (    ̂)
 (    )
, 
where φ is the normal density. The parameter estimates of equation (2) are obtained by 
augmenting the regression equation with the non-selection hazard mit, and we obtain the 
additional parameter estimate on the variable containing the non-selection hazard. And 
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then, we test regression estimates using the non-selection hazard (Heckman, 1979). 
Selectivity effect λ (=ρσ) is tested to justify the Heckman selection model. 
Table 5 shows a sensitivity test on wage and unemployment changes after the 
Heckman adjustment. The top panel presents the results of selection equation (6). We can 
see that elder workers are more likely to be employed in two consecutive waves, 
especially for females. Workers with higher education have more possibility to be 
employed for longer time. As for age, education levels have more prominent effects on 
female workers’ working chances. Married males and single females are more likely to 
be employed. Urban hukou can increase the employment chance dramatically. Hence, as 
many authors such as Wang and Moffatt (2008) points out, urban hukou reflects the 
advantages on social welfare and better job chances. Finally, the larger is family, the 
lower possibility to be hired. It may just reflect the family background is bad for 
education and jobs, as poor family is more likely to have more children and large family 
size. 
The middle panel is the test for selectivity effect. From the inverse mills ratio tests, the 
selection biases exist for both males and females. Likelihood-ratio (LR) chi2 test for 
independence of selection and wage equation show similar results that these two 
equations are significantly correlated. Hence, the Heckman adjustment is necessary for 
males and females. The bottom panel of Table 5 presents the Heckman adjusted results, 
in which wage flexibility does not change its pattern. Only male workers in the urban 
region have flexible wages. One point increase of the local unemployment rate could 
decrease the real hourly wage by 6.048% which is a little less than the OLS results in 
Table 3. Wage flexibility for females is still insignificant. These insignificant results are 
also a little smaller than OLS results. After we divide the sample into two periods, both 
males and females have flexible wages during the 1990s while they recover the rigid 
system during the 2000s. Hence, we find selection biases of OLS results, but would not 
change our basic results. We can conclude our results are robust after Heckman 
adjustment.   
 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
In this paper we examine the wage flexibility in Chinese labor market during a period 
of unprecedented economic growth and significant institutional changes. The rising share 
of workers employed in the private sector and competition from the rural-urban migration 
increase the extent to which pay is determined by market-based economic returns in 
China. Rigid wages can neither help workers keep their jobs as the local labor market is 
bad, nor get more benefit of economic growth as the local labor market is good. With the 
emergence of a mixed economy and dramatic urbanization process, China’s urban labor 
market is supposed to be evolving towards a competitive and flexible market similar to 
those found in OECD countries. However, we find wage flexibility in Chinese labor 
market distinguish itself from the Anglo-American model based on the individual 
bargaining, and the continental European model based on the collective bargaining. Thus, 
we find a unique case of wage flexibility: a coordinated labour market in the transition 
process which has never been studied in literature. 
Wage flexibility could be achieved by efficient bargaining on wage and job at either 
individual or collective level. Based on the privatization and urbanization reform of the 
last two decades, we estimate the effects of labor restructuring on wage flexibility in 
China. We find flexible wages are associated with the firm and employee characteristics 
of coordination and bargaining power in wage setting mechanism. Real wages are 
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flexible in big firms and the public sector with a successful process of command and 
market coordination, while the lagging small/medium firms and private sector are unable 
to catch up with the changes. Employee groups with disadvantageous bargaining 
positions and coordination failures have rigid wages and easily to be laid off. Thus, wage 
flexibility in Chinese labor market is different from the individual bargaining paradigm of 
the USA and UK, in which private sector and small firms are closer to the market and 
have more flexible wages than big firms and the public sector (Devereux, 2001; 
Devereux and Hart, 2006; Shin and Solon, 2007).  
Furthermore, without independent trade union and collective bargaining, wage 
flexibility in Chinese labor market is not completely same as corporatism countries such 
as Germany and Italy either, even though the more flexible wages are also found in the 
highly coordinated big firms and public sector in these countries (Peng and Siebert, 2008; 
Peng and Siebert, 2012). Our analysis indicates that as the wage setting transformed from 
an administratively determined system to a market-based system, the highly command 
and market coordination can achieve a flexible labor market for a short term. With the 
cost of those (female, unskilled and migration) workers with weak bargaining power and 
coordination failure, the coordination process can improve wage flexibility and economy 
efficiency.  
However, the success of command and market coordination in China is actually from 
the privatization policy of central government during the 1990s, which cannot last 
without a formal collective bargaining and trade union system. When the policy changes 
the direction, the renationalization process recovers the wage rigidity sooner than we 
thought. Therefore, the once successful command and market coordination was based on 
short-term policy, which would be dominated by the political cycle in China rather than 
long-term institutional evolution. As the gradual and incremental characters of reform are 
concerned, China seems still in the middle of river leading to a flexible and efficient labor 
market. Studies based on more accurate industry and employment movement analysis 
(Devereux and Hart, 2006; Heckman and Sedlacek, 1985) is expected for the future 
research on the wage flexibility in Chinese labor market. 
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Figure 1 Registered urban unemployment rates (%) in China, 1985-2009 
 
 
 
Data source: Chinese National Labor Statistics Yearbook 1994-2009; Chinese National Statistics Yearbook 
1993-2009. Data of 1986 and 1987 are missing. 
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Table 1 Descriptive statistics in Urban China, the CHNS 1989-2009  
Workforce sample (age:16-65) Male Female 
Age (mean) 39.8 40.1 
Education attainment = primary school (%) 14.6 15.2 
Education attainment = lower middle school (%) 35.3 30.2 
Education attainment = upper middle school (%) 20.8 18.0 
Education attainment = vocational degree (%) 8.7 8.8 
Education attainment = college or above (%) 9.4 6.1 
Marital status = single (%) 20.8 15.6 
Hukou = urban (%) 67.1 66.3 
Family size (mean)   3.9 3.9 
Total number of panel individuals 3,692  4,056  
Average number of observations each year 1,450  1,524  
Total number of observations 11,603  12,192  
Wage earner sample (age:16-65) Male Female 
Employees working in public sector (%) 46.7 39.2 
Employees working in big firms (>=100, %) 29.5 26.0 
Employees with Urban hukou (%) 65.3 62.8 
Mean real wage, 1995 prices (lnW):   
Overall 0.944 0.753 
1989-2000 0.591 0.412 
2000-2009 1.829 1.619 
Working in big firms (>=100) 1.218 0.989 
Working in small/medium firms (<100) 0.783 0.620 
Working in public sector 0.962 0.803 
Working in private sector 0.915 0.685 
Urban hukou 1.031 0.847 
Rural hukou 0.880 0.716 
Real wage annual changes (ΔlnW)*:   
Overall 0.100 0.101 
1989-2000 0.103 0.105 
2000-2009 0.092 0.090 
Working in big firms (>=100) 0.107 0.098 
Working in small/medium firms (<100) 0.095 0.103 
Working in public sector 0.110 0.104 
Working in private sector 0.080 0.095 
Urban hukou 0.103 0.100 
Rural hukou 0.074 0.109 
Total number of panel individuals 3,020  3,106  
Average number of observations each year 1,077  991  
Total number of observations 8,618  7,931  
Notes: *Wage changes are for all paid employees. Annual wage changes are wage changes (ΔlnWit) in the 
equation (2) divided by corresponding number of years, that is, divided by 2 for wage changes over the 
periods of 1989-1991, 1991-1993 and 2004-2006, divided by 3 for wage changes over 1997-2000 and 
2006-2009, and divided by 4 for wage changes over 1993-1997 and 2000-2004.   
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Table 2 Pairwise correlation coefficients of annual Δut, 9 provinces 1989-2009  
 
  Liaoning Heilongjiang Jiangsu Shandong Henan Hubei Hunan Guangxi 
Heilongjiang 0.0521               
  0.8224               
Jiangsu 0.5920*** 0.3418             
  0.0047 0.1294             
Shandong 0.3286 0.2151 0.4451**           
  0.1458 0.349 0.0432           
Henan -0.007 0.1705 0.208 0.1642         
  0.976 0.4599 0.3655 0.477         
Hubei 0.2383 0.4346** 0.3615 0.3565 -0.2731       
  0.2983 0.049 0.1073 0.1127 0.231       
Hunan -0.006 -0.0996 0.1243 0.2589 0.109 0.284     
  0.9794 0.6676 0.5913 0.2572 0.638 0.2122     
Guangxi 0.1934 0.0351 0.3166 0.3286 0.1116 0.345 0.0963   
  0.401 0.8798 0.162 0.1459 0.63 0.1256 0.6779   
Guizhou 0.1568 0.1842 0.133 0.3959 -0.2006 0.6487*** 0.0369 0.5075** 
  0.4974 0.4242 0.5656 0.0757 0.3833 0.0015 0.8738 0.0189 
 
Notes:  Significance levels are reported in italics. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for two-tail tests.  
Data source: Chinese National Labor Statistics Yearbook 1994-2009; Chinese National Statistics Yearbook 
1993-2009 
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Table 3 Wage and unemployment changes (coefficients on Δut from equation 5) 
 
 Male Female 
All -6.197** -5.462 
  (2.644) (5.016) 
Married -7.295** -4.133 
  (2.991) (5.786) 
Single -6.02 -6.614 
  (5.678) (6.79) 
Upper middle school + -6.007* -4.778 
  (3.581) (5.464) 
Upper middle school - -4.527 -6.416* 
  (3.822) (4.039) 
1989-2000 -9.443*** -9.419*** 
  (3.053) (3.207) 
2000-2009 1.918 0.851 
  (6.108) (16.549) 
 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for two-tail tests. There are 9,556 individual observations (2,802/2,091 males/females) in the first 
step equation (4), and 58 province*year weighted observations for the second step equation (5) for the 
entire period 1989-2009 (31 observations in the period of 1989-2000).  
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Table 4 Wage and unemployment changes (coefficients on Δut from 
equation 5) 
 4a. by firm size and period Male Female 
Big firms( >=100) -5.950* -3.937 
 (3.231) (4.65) 
1989-2000 -9.409** -12.709*** 
 (3.789) (3.705) 
2000-2009 0.362 13.202 
 (6.057) (9.872) 
Small/medium (<100) -5.8 -4.48 
 (3.659) (6.437) 
1989-2000 -9.469** -7.344 
 (4.481) (4.519) 
2000-2009 5.337 -9.048 
 (9.626) (22.698) 
4b. by sector and period Male Female 
Public -7.466** -7.031* 
  (3.115) (3.856) 
1989-2000 -10.798*** -12.749*** 
 (3.194) (3.697) 
2000-2009 0.004 6.414 
 (7.48 )        (8.592) 
Private -5.537* 0.021 
  (3.549) (6.853) 
1989-2000 -7.803* -3.138 
 (4.499) (3.507) 
2000-2009 1.938 5.665 
 (9.389) (25.724) 
4c. by hukou and period Male Female 
Urban hukou -6.804** -4.694 
  (2.932) (4.049) 
1989-2000 -9.522** -9.577** 
  (3.706) (3.576) 
2000-2009 -0.087 5.489 
  (6.524) (9.305) 
Rural hukou 3.694 -12.426 
  (6.814) (8.749) 
1989-2000 -0.36 -14.376* 
  (9.824) (8.724) 
2000-2009 19.152 -10.397 
  (21.427) (45.784) 
Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for two-tail tests. There are 9,556 individual observations (2,802/2,091 males/females) in the first 
step equation (4), and 58 province*year weighted observations for the second step equation (5) for the 
entire period 1989-2009 (31 observations in the period of 1989-2000).  
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Table 5 Wage and unemployment changes, Heckman adjustment model (coefficients 
from equations 4-6)  
 Male Female 
5a. Selection equation (6), dependent variable = employment in two 
consecutive waves 
Age 0.171*** 0.455*** 
  (0.047) (0.061) 
Age2 -0.001 -0.007*** 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Age3 -0.012 0.025* 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
Primary 0.334*** 0.474*** 
  (0.075) (0.078) 
Lower middle school 0.562*** 0.829*** 
  (0.069) (0.070) 
Upper middle school 0.736*** 0.995*** 
  (0.073) (0.074) 
Vocational degree 1.084*** 1.487*** 
  (0.082)  (0.083) 
College or above 1.160*** 1.615*** 
  (0.080) (0.091) 
Single -0.159** 0.236*** 
  (0.067) (0.077) 
Urban Hukou 0.846*** 0.894*** 
  (0.044) (0.052) 
Family size -0.050*** -0.060*** 
  (0.014) (0.016) 
Province*Year dummies Yes Yes 
N 10,065 10,535 
5b. Inverse mills ratio tests 
Lambda -0.136*** -0.067*** 
  (0.031) (0.030) 
LR test of indep. eqns. (rho = 0, 
chi2 test): 
13.84 *** 4.79** 
5c. Heckman adjusted wage equation (5) 
All -6.048** -5.673 
  (2.733) (5.054) 
1989-2000 -9.649*** -9.922*** 
 (3.287) (3.132) 
2000-2009 2.481 0.87 
 (5.951) (16.552) 
Province dummies Yes Yes 
Year dummies Yes Yes 
N 2,620 1,951 
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Notes: Standard errors are reported in parentheses. ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% 
levels for two-tail tests. There are 10,065/10,535 males/females in the selection equation, 2,620/1,951 
males/females in the first step of wage equation and 58 province*year weighted observations for the second 
step (31 observations in the period of 1989-2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
